Blain’s Morning Porridge 30th, October 2026 – Key Considerations in Defence Investment

“But it’s the thin red line of heroes when the drums begin to roll…”

Nobody wants to pay taxes or spend money on defence. But both are inevitable. Investment in security has the potential for significant returns for investors and can drive considerable economic gains for nations that spend wisely. History is written by the victors, but the costs of underfunded defence are very clear – ask the losers how well scrimping on Defence worked for them.

LINK TO PODCAST

Key Takeaways:

  • Defence will be a long-term investment theme. Geopolitical challenge and technological rivalry mean conflict risks are rising at a time when the West’s military capabilities are weak and industrial resilience is low.
  • High spending is not the answer – investing in effective defence capabilities is!
  • Layered Air Defence and Autonomous systems are the most urgent defence requirement – both require massive investment.
  • Private capital will be needed, and defence funds need to demonstrate how they can make above market returns.

Earlier this week I read a research note from a noted equity firm. “Given the current uncertainties and geopolitical challenges…” the author wrote, “Defence Investment should be an Absolute Priority for every asset manager.” He went on to recommend “Buys” on Boeing and Rheinmetall.

Nope. Wrong.

I’ve written defence already this week, but following Monday’s comment on how the next war has already begun, a number of Porridge readers called or emailed to ask about investing in defence. So, this morning:

WHAT TO THINK ABOUT WHEN INVESTING IN DEFENCE.

It isn’t as obvious as you might think.

I’ve split this Morning’s Porridge into Five Sections:

  • The need for Defence Investment,
  • The back story of Defence Procurement,
  • The immediate needs: crisis in the Air and Autonomous Warfare,
  • The Prescriptive Defence Primes versus The Adaptive new Battlespace,
  • Investment Considerations and Returns,

And finally, a brief conclusion.

Today’s longer than usual Morning Porridge won’t provide all the answers – but what I will do is organise a series of lunches for interested professional investors in London during November to explain the new Defence Investment thesis in detail. Email me if you fancy attending. (Sorry, professionals only… can’t be seen to be pitching to retail.)

Part One – The Need for Investment

Let me reiterate the reality facing the democratic free-market economies of the West: Europe, Japan, Korea, Australasia and the aligned nations of the Middle East.

  • Strategic Deterrence and Security in a rapidly shifting period of geopolitical repositioning, instability and increasing uncertainty should be their Number 1 priority.
  • Threat levels and conflict risks have clearly risen. Nations that are prepared and ready for war usually don’t have to fight them.
  • The peace that followed the Cold War is over – the fall of the Berlin War was just another chapter.
  • Western economies became complacent and failed to maintain strategic deterrence. Their strategic options are now constrained by the fractured transatlantic relationship, deepening budget crises, war blindness, decades of inadequate leadership and diminished industrial capacity.
  • The next war has already begun. The West is part of the hegemonic struggle between China and the USA – which is going to be a dominant feature of this century.
  • Increased Defence investment will be a long-term reality. It will be a cost on economies, but also a driver of growth.
  • Ukraine and Iran are kinetic regional campaigns of the new war.
  • Cyber-attacks, sabotage, disinformation and other forms of coercive aggression will increasingly be used to undermine national resilience – and are part of the same war.
  • China is able to challenge the USA because it’s focused on transforming the military balance with anti-ship missiles that may negate Carrier Task Forces, hypersonic missiles, drones, robots, and precision weapons – it has successfully played defence catch-up.
  • Calls for the share of GDP dedicated to defence is just noise – all that matters is combat capability!

To address these crises – particularly given the limited funding headroom of heavily indebted governments – private investment into the defence sector is a fundamental necessity. It’s an investment in the future, but it will still have to show the probability of attractive returns. One positive is that governments, especially those that win, honour defence contracts!

Part Two – The backstory of traditional Defence Investment

Defence Investment was never simple – the dynamics have always been … different. Like successful tech investment, it requires a degree of knowledge, expertise, connections and experience to foresee what comes next.

The primary goal of any government is security, knowing that if the nation is prepared and ready to fight it will likely deter enemies from attacking. They know wars are won by the armies that are best led, trained, managed, motivated, supplied and equipped to do so. Ask a soldier, sailor or airman what they need to win and they will answer – everything. They are professionals and want the right tools for the job – but their employer, the state, is usually close to bust.

Security becomes an exercise in optimisation: balancing the sunk costs of defence relative to the threat level and what the economy can bear. Politicians know the defence sector has considerable economic and resilience multiplier effects, and can create jobs, but that flag-draped body bags fighting wars with little rhyme or reason cost votes.

In wartime and times of increasing tension the rising threat level changes the equation. Defence spending rises to give the Military the assets they will have no doubt been warning they’ve needed for years.

That’s pretty much the situation today. Years of underinvestment, delusions about the peace dividend, and deindustrialisation leave the nations of the West chronically unprepared for what defence means in terms of manufacturing, infrastructure and redirection of the economy. In the worst case, can the nations of the West convert peacetime post-industrial economies into the total-war economies that won WW2?

The trick to investing successfully in Defence is to understand what the critical military requirements will be and investing in them early, knowing they will be required. That’s not a spread-sheet skill, a financial structuring exercise, or something Claude can do for you. It will be knowledge based, understanding the why, what, and how of the future battlespace. It’s about aligning expertise and experience with the art of the possible – which is why the top defence funds are heavy not just with senior military, but former intelligence officers, diplomats, industrialists and financiers.

Then there is process.

In defence there is one monopoly buyer: the government procurement agencies who deal with an oligopoly of suppliers – the Defence Industry.

The two have worked well in the past. The principals of mass industrial manufacturing were not invented by Henry Ford, but in the Royal Navy dockyards of the 18th Century turning out cannons, sails, rope and ships for the Navy that ruled the seas for neigh on 3 centuries. These techniques swiftly spread to the commercial world, spurring industrial innovation and giving the UK its vast (and well manned) Merchant Fleet that dominated global trade during the hegemonic era of British Empire.

However, during long-periods of relative peace, procurement systems became increasingly detached from the warfighters. Throughout history there have been many sudden military spending “surges” in response to the recognition of new threats. A General recently noted in 1935 the UK’s defence spending had fallen to 3% of GDP but rose to 10% by 1940 and was 50% of the perfected total-war economy of 1945.

Way back in the 1960s President Eisenhower warned how the Military Industrial Complex of defence firms might band together to find to extract parasitic returns from the military and procurement bureaucracies. In the 1980s I wrote my degree dissertation on how the unhealthy system led to massive cost overruns, delays and compromised weapon systems – there were no shortages of case studies of botched programmes. Procurement failure, (and outright corruption), runs parallel to military history.

The ultimate economic objective of any bureaucrat is to preserve their job and responsibilities. The objective of arms manufacturers is to make profits. The Defence Primes of the military industrial complex encouraged the military to gold plate their weapon specifications and constantly change them during design – leading to escalating costs and larger returns.

In Europe there was the added refinement of international cooperation on weapon systems. Each nation sought production preferment while prioritising their own defence requirements. It led to compromised designs from multinational committees that took years to deliver Camels (horses designed by a committee.) One example is generations of indifferent consortium frontline aircraft defending 3 of the four largest European states. The French did their own thing – and produced aircraft just as good (some say better) and more effective. (Recently, my brother took early retirement rather than face years of frustration leading a design team while negotiating on the next multinational fighter!)

Until recently, to understand defence investment before 2022, the only real analytical requirement was to predict the profits from “exquisite” cost-plus projects that would feed into the bottom line of the Primes – analytical accounting. Then defence became a backwater following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – with very few finance professionals following it, except for M&A opportunities.

Some thought the Primes would evolve into civilian suppliers with vestigial defence departments servicing and replacing kit, literally forging unnecessary tanks into ploughshares. Politicians tried to monetise the peace dividend by cutting orders. But the primes responded by simply raising prices – cunningly disguised within complex contacts and deliberately ignored by the civil servants looking to preserve their power and authority.

The result was predictable. The front-line military found themselves increasingly frustrated by cuts in numbers and equipment – but the actual effect was less defence for more money.

Today the UK armed forces cost £62 bln per annum, ranking 6th in the World behind India and ahead of Poland. But, in terms of literal bang for the buck, UK defence spending delivers incredibly poor capability for the money spent. That’s the real crisis in UK defence spending – not how much, but how poorly the money has been spent for decades.

Part Three – The immediate crisis in the Air, the risks of Autonomous Warfare, and what next

Investors considering defence tend to ask first about drone technology. If they’ve listened to a few podcasts, and maybe read some reports, they’ll know that issues like the availability of one-way jet engines, the security of supply chains, and ensuring there are no Chinese trackers embedded in parts sourced externally are all critically important. Those closer to the action will want to ask about how many of a firm’s drones Ukraine’s Azov brigade has ordered.

However, the sheer number of start-ups means the drone market is already becoming commoditised with multiple unicorn valuations ascribed to those with even fairly modest contracts, while a host of new constructors are banging on the door. The scale of any market is also limited by each nation wanting to favour their own drones – we are still a long way from European interoperability and commonality. What sub-scale Drone firms will be worth as the Drone sector matures and consolidates will be… interesting.

While drones have more than proved their worth in Ukraine, countering them is even more important. The single most critical need across European defence is layered air defences.

The Russians are manufacturing hundreds of thousands of attack drones in plants dispersed as far away from Ukraine strike drones as possible. These are delivering around 6000 jet-powered Gerans monthly, and that number is expected to rise as more numerous prop-driven drone production declines. The Gerans are more difficult to intercept and are being used in complex, highly coordinated, timed attacks which deliver a slew of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonics, and slower prop driven drones to overwhelm Ukraine’s stretched defences. (That said, Ukraine is now shooting down around 60% of jets and 95% of prop-powered drones.)

But in the face of Ukraine successes, and Russian drone deliveries and their increasing expertise in using them, the brutal reality is the UK lacks any meaningful and credible air defence.

Let’s go back to 1940. “The Few”, the fighter pilots of the RAF get the credit, but the Battle of Britain was won because Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding built a superb machine to defend the country from aerial assault. He coordinated a system of radar and observers to vector RAF fighters to the enemy, brought the excellent Spitfire and Hurricane 8-gun fighters into squadron service, and introduced dispersed airfields supported by swift repair and maintenance, while new factories turned out more fighters than the Germans shot down. The only weakness was the threat of an unsustainable loss of pilots, “The Few”, in what became an attritional battle with the Luftwaffe.

Dowding is quoted in the film: “Our young men will have to shoot down their young men at the rate of five to one“. That ratio was roughly right: 544 RAF fighter pilots died versus over 2500 Luftwaffe aircrew. There are still 42 Spitfires flying in the UK and a couple of Hurricanes. There is nothing quite like the song of a Merlin engine as their familiar shapes roar overhead. (Full credit to RJ Mitchell, the designer of the Spitfire, for persuading Rolls Royce to develop the Merlin – which equipped many of the best allied aircraft.)

Today, the RAF has a forward fleet of some 95 Typhoon fighters, (another 30 are in storage or rebuild). On any given day only about 60 are available for operations. The estimated “whole life” cost of the Typhoon fleet in 2011 was £37 bln. Now its £5.7 bln per annum. It’s now a compromised ground attack bomber – effectively a very expensive dump truck doing what drones might do, but when armed with the latest APKWS 70mm rockets in fighter mode it apparently takes down drones effectively enough.

Aside from the Typhoons there is no plan to defend the UK from massed or focused aerial attacks, except to hope one of the Royal Navy Type 45 air-defence destroyers is available – and since most of them spend more time in drydock than at sea, it’s a triple 6 dice throw in the game of geopolitical Risk.

Next to the need for Layered Air Defence to counter Russian Missiles and Drones, is the development of battle-space Autonomy and integrated AI.

At present unmanned drones are piloted by humans into their targets, but in the very near future there will be autonomously controlled, taught to take out targets. That raises massive concerns, breaking Asimov’s First Law of Robotics: that an AI can never harm humans, but it’s going to happen.

By dint of the West’s mastery in tech and AI, Autonomous weapons may well be a war-winning advance, and it will happen by ensuring the West’s autonomous fighting units are better, more effective and, critically, still under the operational mission control by humans. AI will clearly be part of the system. As such it’s a massive high return, war-winning, deterrence establishing, investment play.

And even if we solve the air defence issue, win the autonomy war, then the next issues will emerge in terms of protecting vital maritime nodes, supply chains, dispersed production and lots more.

Part Four – The New Wartime Defence Reality

There is a quote: “Generals [and defence ministries] always prepare to fight the last war, especially if they won it.” The defence primes spent the last 35 years producing weapons systems which were each a marginal improvement on the last, to refight the imagined battles of the Cold War which contemporary Generals had trained to fight.

Essentially these weapons programmes were prescriptive – designed to address the battlespace threats that were expected to arise. What we’ve seen in Ukraine is the need for adaptive weaponry – resulting in a constant race to evolve tactics and kit on an ever-evolving battlespace.

The invasion of Ukraine revealed how much rising conflict risks exposed Europe’s neglected defence industry and capacity. The immediate market response was predicable – address the threat with money! Asset managers piled into the Primes, benefitting names like Rheinmetall and BAE. When it became clear how slowly new European defence spending would rise (due to budget constraints), their stock prices retreated almost as smartly. It was an entirely predictable market knee-jerk.

The reality of the Ukraine war has shown the need for immediate defence, not new programmes ploughing scare resources into exquisite new tanks, planes or ship programmes that may take decades to deliver. It is an adaptive, not prescriptive, conflict.

The pace of military innovation on the frontline and in procurement has been stupendous. The sense of threat has revealed the West’s vulnerabilities across the whole battlespace – from the Low Earth Orbitals down to the fibre-optic nodes under the ocean. Once a threat is recognised – they become problem that frontline warfighters and bright young start-ups seek to solve swiftly.

The Defence Primes are big firms with significant internal bureaucracies. They have been left behind by the pace of adaptation in the battlespace. Some are trying to reinvent themselves by purchasing start-ups for their tech. One American sub-prime (ha-ha) is using the depth of US capital markets to fund its acquisition of European defence-tech to rebadge as their own.

Today it takes days or weeks to invent, innovate and deploy new weapons – in the past it would have taken years for the Primes to try and extract maximum value from a keenly contested government contract. Amateur soldiers brag about strategy, but professionals fret about logistics – thus it’s manufacturing capacity, supply lines, dispersion and infrastructure that matters as much.

Even procurement has changed – Ukraine lets combat units pick what they want from its Brave1 digital market and rewards them for success with larger spending allocations. Other nations are trying to innovate similar market-based approaches – but in the face of bureaucracies seeking to control the system, there is limited success.

Another aspect is asymmetric warfare. Ukraine would swiftly bankrupt itself if it were to spend $2 million on a Patriot missile for every $300 Drone it shot down. It was very quickly shown that cheap interceptors could shoot down cheap drones. As the drones evolved, the interceptors and guidance systems evolved. The Ukrainian’s innovated Elon Musk’s Starlink into their targeting and guidance, enabling them to take out Russian logistics and now energy infrastructure.

An aside:

In the total war that Ukraine now finds itself in, a struggle for national survival, how should we deal with Elon Musk? Does his unlimited wealth entitle him to unlimited, and unaccountable power? Should the next US administration extradite him to Ukraine to stand trial for his betrayal after he switched off Starlink? Or more realistically, should the US government nationalise Starlink, and buy it out from at a nominal cost on the basis such a powerful strategic resource should not be controlled by an erratic politically motivated individual who favours the enemies of the west?

Part Five – Investment considerations on Defence Investment

Defence Investment was not even a backwater of the investment world for decades – it ranked lower than pornography, gambling and smokes. Parts of the conservative European investment community still struggles to embrace its new realities.

When I’ve been speaking with some of the West’s largest asset allocators, multi-billion pension and insurance funds, I’m still surprised at the hesitancy towards conflict risks and defence investment. That may be because senior-level managers in funds today will have some 20-25 years’ experience under their belt. They’ve spent the bulk of their post 2008 crisis careers in organisations that enthusiastically embraced ESG (environment, social and governance) themes that branded defence investment an evil. That’s coloured the institutional mindset/memory of many investment firms.

Others see defence as only a short-term necessity, in the same terms as in Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem Tommy:

For it’s Tommy this, and Tommy that, an’ chuck him out, the brute,

But it’s “Saviour of ‘is country” when the guns begin to shoot.”

Other funds are only prepared to invest in non-kinetic, non-bang, non-lethal investments – which I respect for the reason that conscientious objectors are often the bravest people in times of war.

But it’s clear many funds fear potential ESG consequences from defence investment. To work around the ugly reality that defence investments might leave blood on the foyer floor, the expression Dual-Use was invented – stressing the potential civilian upside of defence investments. It’s a distraction – to make a bullet requires a long and complex supply chain, to know where to fire it needs systems and intelligence, and to get that bullet into a rifle requires complex logistics. Which aspects of that product chain are lethal, and which are not?

The reality is Europe will not deter Russia by making weapons designed not to hurt anyone. The way we stop Russia is by making them very aware that Europe is prepared to kill them in vast numbers if they threaten us. Kill chains are brutal and defence investment is about making them as efficient and effective as possible. That is the brutal reality of war. No one wants it, but the only way to avoid conflict is to be prepared to fight it with 110% commitment.

The other doubt around defence investment are the potential returns. As defence contracts move from exquisite cost-plus programmes to cheaper, good-enough weaponry, investors ask if governments will pay up or will they expect cut-price, patriotic mates-rates and limit the appearance of profiteering during a period of crisis? Historically, the USA and UK have always paid their contractors (eventually).

There is a risk that the cheap and plentiful US Capital Markets fuelling US investment might cause speculative bubbles in defence. Most of the £7 bln of PE funding of European defence firms this year has come from the US – including US primes buying up smaller European firms – seeking to acquire their IP to incorporate into the weapons they want to sell back to Europe! There is a risk some sectors of the market, for instance Drones, becomes over-hyped. That’s another example of why defence is knowledge led.

Then there are concerns that the current slow PE exit market could undermine defence funds in Venture Capital and Private Equity as they seek profitable exit opportunities, and how values might plummet if the threat level falls. Again, the trick is to anticipate what the warfighters will need and make sure they get it – which is no different to any other tech sector.

It also worth making clear just how wide and deep the total defence spectrum is.

David Murrin, Co-Founder of Spitfire Strategic, recently commented that Europe needs “comprehensive strategic mobilisation, accelerated rearmament, defence-industrial policy designed for wartime expansion, distributed fifth generation manufacturing, affordable intelligent mass, layers defence air, land and sea missile defences, a focus on battlespace adaptation, and critically, the mobilisation of private capital to fund it.”

Conclusions

Defence investment was never simple. There is no such thing as an overnight defence expert – it requires knowledge, experience and expertise. But there is a revolution underway in defence – and it’s going to be long term. While many investors struggle with the concept today, defence investment will become core to any portfolio as the threat level rises.

Wars are not always won by the nations that have the best generals and troops, but by the ones that show themselves to be most resilient and adaptive – capable of learning, designing, testing, manufacturing and fielding new war-winning capabilities.  Today, that means being able to combine high end tech with affordable, autonomous, attritable and AI enabled weapons systems. These abilities need to be supported by economies that can show distributed manufacturing, supply chain resilience, access to critical materials, and the ability to sustain the pace of operations in terms of war stocks and replace battlefield losses. And they need to do all these things faster, better and more effectively than their enemy.

To invest in that opportunity – you need to understand it. And that’s what I’m here to do. Give me a shout if you want to hear more about how Spitfire Strategic Capital’s sector theses.

Out of time and back to the day job… Have a great weekend – its Halloween tomorrow, so I better make sure my wife has done the preflight checks on her broomstick!

Bill Blain

Author of the Morning Porridge
CEO Windshift Capital
Advisor – Spitfire Strategic Capital

Meanwhile, don’t forget about my new book: The Battle for Hamble

You can read a review on the Society of Professional Economist’s website here.

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